The Pen

On the night of Wednesday, November 11, 2026, the board of Nvidia met without its chief executive. By Thursday morning he was gone. Jensen Huang, who had co-founded the company at a Denny’s in San Jose in 1993 and run it for thirty-three years, resigned as president, chief executive and board member, effective immediately. The announcement named his successors in the same breath: Colette Kress, the chief financial officer since 2013, as interim chief executive, and Harvey C. Jones, formerly the chief of Synopsys, as the board’s first-ever chair. AP reported that Nvidia “had no succession plan to prepare for the possibility of the departure of Huang, who was synonymous with Nvidia for more than 30 years in much the same way Steve Jobs embodied Apple.” The overhaul took one night.

The reason the world was given was an affair. Two days earlier, Huang had written to employees: “I was unfaithful to my wife. My actions hurt her and our children. There is no excuse for what I did.” He did not name the woman. On the 11th the New York Times reported, citing five people who worked at Nvidia, that one relationship was with Kimberly Powell, the company’s vice president of health care, who reports directly to him; two of those people described video of the two being affectionate at a San Jose hotel during a conference in March, video the Times said it had not seen. Both are married to other people. Reuters reported a third relationship, with an unnamed employee. The board met the night the Powell story ran, and the resignation came within hours of it.

That is the story the world covered, and it is a story. The one underneath it is about a list.

For at least eighteen months before the resignation, four agencies of the US government wanted a Singapore company called Megaspeed placed on the Entity List, the Commerce Department’s register of foreign companies American exporters may not sell to without a license. Treasury, Defense, the US Trade Representative and State all favored it, for months, by the Treasury Secretary’s own account. The one department with the authority to do it never did. The company had gone from $33 million in total assets to almost $3 billion in twelve months and become one of Nvidia’s largest customers. It was run by a Chinese citizen whom US intelligence called an asset and whom no court has charged with anything.

The protagonist of this story is not Jensen Huang. It is the company, and the pen that never signed.

1. The company

Megaspeed began as 7Road International, incorporated in Singapore in 2015. In March 2023 it took the name Megaspeed, and ownership passed to Huang Le Ltd., a company controlled by Alice Huang, who became managing director. Around November 2023 the shares moved again, to another Singapore company, Swiftdata, and her name came off the filings as a director. Short-seller reports and employees said she remained involved in operations regardless.

The balance sheet is the part that does not read like a cloud provider’s. Total assets grew from $33 million at the end of 2023 to almost $3 billion in 2024, roughly ninety-fold, and revenue went from nothing in 2023 to over $294 million in 2024. The purchases that built it: more than $4.8 billion of advanced Nvidia chips over two years, by CNBC’s count; “more than $4 billion,” by AP’s; and, when the New York Times profiled the company in October 2025, a year before the scandal, it was poised to buy another $2 billion over the following year. Between June 2024 and June 2025, more than 200 shipments of restricted Nvidia technology reached Speedmatrix, its Malaysian affiliate.

The New York Times had put a version of this on the record in October 2025, under a headline asking whether China was buying banned Nvidia chips: “A Mystery C.E.O. and Billions in Sales.” The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security had opened an investigation into Megaspeed in 2024, into whether it was redirecting chips to China, and later handed the case to the Justice Department. Megaspeed has said it cooperated with BIS, hired a US law firm to conduct what it called a “comprehensive census” of its chips, and “welcomes appropriate government scrutiny.” In December 2025 it said there was “no evidence” of illicit exports.

A short-selling research firm, Culper Research, argued in May 2026 that the company was secretly financed by Alibaba through shell companies, pointing to refundable deposits from an unidentified source among its liabilities. The Financial Times reported independently, in November, that documents show Alibaba lent money to Megaspeed through subsidiaries. Culper is a short seller and stood to profit if the story was bad; the FT reporting did not depend on it.

What no one has established is the thing the whole story sits on: that Megaspeed diverted anything. No court has found it. The allegations rest on investigations and short-seller analysis, and the company denies them. What is documented is the shape around the question: an ownership chain that kept moving, a balance sheet that grew ninety-fold in a single year, an affiliate taking two hundred shipments of restricted technology, and a list that never gained its name.

2. The woman

Alice Huang, also known as Huang Le, is a Chinese citizen. She shares a surname with Jensen Huang and is not related to him, a disclaimer AP printed when the story broke.

Her reported background is journalism and finance. AFP found an online profile listing HSBC, CCTV and Hunan TV, and said it could not verify it. The Wall Street Journal reported that she had been a television reporter in China and joined Shanghai Hexi Investment Management as deputy general manager in November 2015. The firm’s founder, Kang Wei, became her husband, and introduced her to Jensen Huang at a tech gathering in Taipei.

On October 29, 2026, the New York Times reported that US officials had concluded she was a Chinese intelligence asset funneling information to Beijing, and that Trump had been briefed roughly a year earlier and taken no action. China denies the claim. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Guo Jiakun, called the narrative “entirely baseless” and “slander and smear.”

Between the denial and the intelligence conclusion sits the only government finding on her conduct, and it is not about espionage. Singapore questioned her and impounded her passport in 2025 as part of its own investigation into Megaspeed. It concluded there was not enough evidence she had committed a crime, suspected she had given “inaccurate information” to downplay her role at the company, and barred her from returning. Singapore also said it had been asking the US Justice Department and the FBI for help since September 2025, and had received limited assistance.

Every part of that is the record, and the record does not settle the question.

3. The list

The Entity List is the Commerce Department’s register of foreign companies American exporters may not sell to without a license. Placement means the department believes there is a risk the company is involved in activity contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests. It is administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security, the agency that enforces the chip controls, and it cuts a named company off from American technology rather than restricting a product category. It is the sharpest tool short of a statute.

Four agencies wanted Megaspeed on it. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC on November 13 that Treasury, Defense, the US Trade Representative and State had favored putting Megaspeed on the list for months. “Commerce has the pen,” he said. “And you will have to ask them about their internal processes.”

The Commerce Department has added no company to the Entity List since October 2025. That is not a fact about Megaspeed; it is the department’s whole recent record. Reuters reported in June 2026 that the administration had declined to place more than a hundred companies flagged as national-security risks on the trade blacklist, including the AI startup DeepSeek and the memory chipmaker CXMT.

Justice, meanwhile, was working. In March 2026 the Justice Department indicted three people tied to Super Micro Computer, including its co-founder Wally Liaw, over the alleged smuggling of $2.5 billion of Nvidia-powered servers into China through a Southeast Asian pass-through entity identified in the case only as “Company One.” Prosecution could reach people. The list, the tool aimed at companies, never moved.

Chris McGuire of the Council on Foreign Relations gave the enforcement reading to CBS News: “The real scandal here is the lack of enforcement of export controls.” Commerce, he said, had known for as long as a year that Megaspeed was run by a woman US intelligence believed was a Chinese asset, “and they did nothing.”

4. The department

The department with the pen is run by Howard Lutnick.

The warning reached him early. Axios reported that Lutnick received a highly classified memo warning about Jensen Huang’s relationship with Alice Huang, drafted under Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s oversight and circulated before Trump’s trip to China on May 13–15, 2026. Rubio also warned Trump directly, aboard Air Force One, before a refuelling stop in Anchorage, where Alice Huang joined the delegation.

Trump authorized a crackdown on companies suspected of diverting Nvidia chips to China on at least three occasions in 2026: May, August and November 5. It did not happen. Bessent put the policy in one sentence: “President Trump made it very clear that China should not receive any Nvidia chips above H100s.”

On Thursday, November 12, the day Huang’s resignation was announced, the administration’s principals met in the Situation Room: Lutnick, Bessent, Defense Secretary Hegseth, Trade Representative Greer and Rubio. Bessent confronted Lutnick about resisting the controls on Megaspeed, and the group sided with Bessent. Per the Axios account, which rests on six unnamed high-level sources, Lutnick “appeared to agree, but then muttered under his breath, ‘I need to check with the president.’” Trump called Elon Musk for a second opinion; Musk backed the others; Lutnick warned that the controls “will start a trade war with China.” Outside the Oval Office, he proposed: “I’ll develop some options and come back.”

A Commerce Department spokesperson, Kristen Eichamer, denied that Bessent confronted Lutnick.

Cantor Fitzgerald, the firm Lutnick formerly chaired and his sons Brandon and Kyle now run, reported more than 3.5 million Nvidia shares at the end of September 2025, valued at $652 million. By the end of March 2026 it held 1.78 million, valued at $310 million: a 49% cut, across the months when administration officials were pressing Lutnick to act. CNBC, which analysed the filings, states plainly that there is no evidence Cantor’s business interests influenced Lutnick’s decisions. The firm kept arranging financing for Nvidia’s business partners, hosted Huang for investor meetings in New York in late September, and maintained a $350 price target in an October 3 report. The timing is a story. The influence is not a finding, and no one has made it one.

5. The man

Huang co-founded Nvidia in 1993 with two other engineers at a Denny’s in San Jose, and led it for thirty-three years, from video-game graphics to the compute layer under essentially every frontier model, and to a market value of $5.3 trillion by September 2026.

The record shows he saw the Megaspeed story coming. The Times reported on the company and its mystery chief executive in October 2025. Wired reported that Huang engaged the crisis public-relations firm Heller as early as that October, shortly after the first story. On October 29, 2026, the Times reported that US officials had concluded Alice Huang was a Chinese intelligence asset, that surveillance showed her close to him, and that Trump had been briefed a year earlier and done nothing. Nvidia opened an investigation and said it remained confident in its chief executive.

On November 8 he wrote to employees: “I was unfaithful to my wife. My actions hurt her and our children. There is no excuse for what I did.” The board opened an independent investigation, led by Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. On November 11 the Times reported the relationship with Powell. The board met that night. By Thursday morning he was out; the company’s release gave no reason.

The market had been falling since early October, before the spy story and before the resignation. The week of the resignation was Nvidia’s sixth straight weekly decline, the longest losing streak since 2012, and shares fell 13% in it, the most since April 2025. CNBC put the total loss since early October at roughly $1.7 trillion, about 30% of the company’s value, enough to push Nvidia below Apple. The Wall Street Journal measured the single week at $573 billion, the largest weekly market-cap loss on record, taking the company below $4 trillion.

Bessent, for one, thought the story was bigger than the man. “The real story here should be: did Nvidia know their client, and was there a robust effort at Nvidia to make sure that there was no leakage and that they were selling to what were obviously pass-through shell companies?” he asked the BBC. The Senate Banking Committee’s chairman, Tim Scott, asked Huang to testify on December 3 and Lutnick on December 10. Lutnick agreed to appear voluntarily.

6. What is not established

The story has edges, and the record marks every one of them.

That Alice Huang was a spy is not established. The intelligence is contested inside the US government: multiple sources told CNN it does not prove she was acting as a spy; some officials at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence called the characterization “not entirely accurate and over-torqued”; CIA officials were not convinced the intercepts showed her knowingly funneling information. The attorney general, Todd Blanche, said the Justice Department had reached “no conclusions… around who she is or is not.” Trump, asked whether Huang should have resigned, said: “The big thing is, was the woman a spy? And I don’t know if that’s been determined yet. But if the woman was a spy, yes. If the woman was not a spy, perhaps it would be different.”

That she obtained anything from Jensen Huang is not established. Nvidia’s board said it had no reason to believe company secrets were compromised.

That Megaspeed diverted chips is not established. No court has found it. The allegations rest on investigations and short-seller analysis.

That she is now in Beijing is not established; the reports are unconfirmed.

That Cantor’s position influenced Lutnick is not established, and CNBC explicitly declines to draw the inference.

That Huang was removed for his policy disagreements is not established, and nothing supports it: the resignation came within hours of the Powell reporting, not of any policy fight.

What is documented is the rest of it: the ownership chain, the ninety-fold year, the billions in purchases, the two hundred shipments, the four agencies, the three authorizations, and a list without a new name since October 2025.

The pen

Nvidia reports earnings on November 17, with analysts polled by LSEG projecting 91% year-over-year revenue growth, to $108.9 billion. The hearings are scheduled: Huang on December 3, Lutnick on December 10. The Entity List remains without a new name. Megaspeed has not been charged, listed or, so far as the record shows, restricted in any way. Alice Huang’s whereabouts are unconfirmed. And the man whose relationship with her made the story legible is gone from his company in a way no policy dispute ever managed.

The affair answered, in one morning, the question of who would run Nvidia. It did not touch the question underneath it: whether the United States would use the tool it holds against the company that bought $4.8 billion of its chips. Four agencies say they wanted to. The department with the pen said it would come back with options. The pen is still where it was.